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the timeless classic, It's a Wonderful Life, an angel named
Clarence shows main character George Bailey how the world
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would have looked without him in it.1 It is the ultimate "what if'
moment, and George discovers that if he had not been born, the world
would have been a worse place. His brother would have died as a
young boy, soldiers who his brother would have otherwise saved
would have all passed away, and the town he grew up in would have
been in ruins. It is a life-affirming movie, and perhaps that is why
many of us catch at least a moment of it during December as it loops
twenty-four hours a day on television. Wondering what our families'
and friends' lives would be like without us is quite an exercise-one
that makes us appreciate what we have suffered and enjoyed, how we
have learned from those moments, and what we have to look forward
to as life goes on.
Perhaps because of movies like It's a Wonderful Life, we think of
asking this "what if' question as a personal reflective experience.
But, it need not be limited as such. The process of considering what
life might be like without a particular moment or person can have
broader application. Just as in the personal sphere, asking this
question in the academic context forces us to consider what the
effect-both good and bad-of a particular moment has been, how as
a society we have benefited or suffered from that moment, and how
life might have been different without that moment. Through this
exercise, an angel may not necessarily earn its wings, but we will gain
a more concrete understanding of what a particular moment has
meant.
It is through a "what if' lens that this Essay tackles the already
well-discussed cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 2 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal.3 But, unlike the scholarship that has addressed these cases
so far, this Essay stakes out a completely different methodological
Rather than predicting what courts might do with
approach.4
Twombly and Iqbal going forward, it asks what might have been had
1IT'S AWONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
4 Scholarship to date has been fairly predictive and descriptive, a necessity given how
recently the cases came down. There has also been some empirical work about motions to
dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal, but even those studies are in the very early stages. See,
e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 601-02 (2010); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An
Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV.
603 (2012); see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011). Only time will give us a better picture

of how life will actually change under these cases.

HeinOnline -- 90 Or. L. Rev. 1148 2011-2012

2012]

What If?: A Study ofSeminal Cases as ifDecided
Under a Twombly/Iqbal Regime

1149

Twombly and Iqbal existed decades ago. To engage in this exercise,
this Essay looks at actual complaints in cases that are common fare in
legal circles and applies the standards enunciated in Twombly and
Iqbal to them. By doing so, this Essay attempts to concretely think
about the consequences of a Twombly/Iqbal pleading regime by
considering the potential impact that a successful motion to dismiss
might have had on cases whose existence are taken for granted today.
Part I of this Essay briefly summarizes the two seminal Supreme
Court cases that provide the backdrop for this study: Regents of the
6
5
University of Calfornia v. Bakke and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
Part II applies Twombly and Iqbal to the original complaints filed in
Bakke and Price Waterhouse and argues that there is a strong
likelihood that the Court would have dismissed those complaints
under a Twombly/Iqbal regime. Finally, Part III considers what the
impact would have been if the Court had dismissed those cases. For
example, the application of Twombly and Iqbal is likely to impact
substantive claims historically brought by institutional plaintiffs.
Even though institutional litigation has become so common over the
past few decades, the Twombly/Iqbal regime may mark the beginning
of its demise.
A consideration of what the law would be like had Twombly and
Iqbal come earlier requires both micro- and macro-considerations. At
the micro-level, it is worth thinking about whether the plaintiffs could
have refiled the complaints so that they would have ultimately
survived a motion to dismiss. At the macro-level, the exercise
involves a broader consideration of what would have happened had
the Court never decided the cases. In other words, how would the
doctrines defined by that seminal case have been affected? And, even
5 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

I reviewed complaints in other seminal cases, including the

following: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.,
130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997); J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th
Cir. 1985); and Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). The issues presented in Oncale and Plyler were
purely legal, and the complaints stated sufficient facts to arguably survive a motion to
dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal. The complaint in Jenson contained explicit examples
of the offending discriminatory statements and actions such that there was only an issue of
law.

However, the complaints in Adarand, Croson, Hopwood, and Monell were more

difficult to predict. Like Bakke and Hopkins, there is a good argument that each of these
complaints might not have survived a motion to dismiss in a Twombly/Iqbal regime.
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more broadly, how might the development of particular kinds of law
practice have changed and how might other modes of social change
have been utilized? By considering the effect of Twombly and Iqbal
in this way,. this Essay offers yet another lens through which to
consider the benefits and drawbacks of a Twombly/Iqbal regime.
I.
BACKGROUND OF THE SEMINAL CASES

A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Allan Bakke applied to the University of California at Davis
School of Medicine in 1973 and 1974.
His Medical College
Aptitude Test scores and his grade point average qualified him for an
interview with the Davis admissions team both years. Yet, he was
not admitted as a medical student either time. Given the competitive
nature of the medical school application process, this was not all that
surprising. Of the 2644 applicants in 1973, only 814 made it to the
interview stage, and of those, Davis admitted only one hundred. 9
Similarly, in 1974, there were 3737 applicants, of which Davis
interviewed only 462 for the one hundred spots available.' 0 In 1973,
the year of his second application, thirty-two nonminority applicants
who had scores higher than Bakke were also not admitted." Of those
thirty-two, twelve did not make it on the wait list.12 So, Bakke was
not the only well-qualified candidate that Davis rejected. Where
some might see stiff competition, Bakke saw unfairness. Namely, he
saw that medical school applicants of color were admitted, while he
was not.
Bakke was not imagining that persons of color were gaining entry
into the medical school to which he aspired. In 1969, Davis began a
concerted effort to increase the number of minority students in its
medical school. Initially, it set aside a certain number of the one
hundred available spots in its entering class for applicants who were
7 Sharon Elizabeth Rush, SharingSpace: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN.

L. REV. 1, 45 (1999).
8 Id.

9 Id.
10 Id.

11 Harvey Gee, Book Note, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 277, 285 (2001) (reviewing
HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION,

AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

(2000)).
2 Id.
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"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged." 13 In 1974, the
school changed this program to provide spots for minority
candidates.14 Specifically, it set aside sixteen of its one hundred
available spots. The move was an effort to combat institutional
racism, an effort in which many public colleges and universities were
engaged.
When Bakke was rejected in 1974, he did not see the Davis
admission system as a righting of institutional racism. To the
contrary, he saw the admission system itself as racist; he did not gain
entry into medical school when he otherwise would have because
less-qualified minority students were given priority admission. While
the terminology of "reverse discrimination" had not made its way into
common parlance quite yet, that is exactly what Bakke perceived.
And Bakke found a lawyer to make a legal claim that he had suffered
such discrimination. In 1974, Bakke filed a complaint in what
became the landmark case of Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke.
Bakke filed his case in the Superior Court of the State of
California, alleging that the Davis admissions policies violated (1) the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, (2) the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
California Constitution, and (3) the Federal Civil Rights Act. He
asked the court to require Davis to admit him into its medical school.
His lawyer was a San Francisco-based practitioner named Reynold
Colvin.1 5 Colvin was a well-regarded trial lawyer, and he by all
accounts handled the case well, but he was not a constitutional
scholar. However, at the beginning of Bakke's case, it is likely that
neither Bakke himself nor Colvin knew that the case would ultimately
become a standard fixture in law school constitutional law courses.
Bakke and Colvin cared only about getting Bakke into medical
school.
At trial, Bakke did not find that success. While the trial court
questioned the admissions policy and ultimately held that it was
unconstitutional, the court did not order Davis to admit Bakke.17 The
13Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978).
14 Rush, supranote 7, at 44.

IS Gee, supranote I, at 286.
16 Adolphus Levi Williams, Jr., A CriticalAnalysis of the Bakke Case, 16 S.U. L. REV.

129, 143 (1989).
17 Id. at 154.
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court did, however, order that Davis consider Bakke for admission
along with other candidates without regard to his or their race.8 Both
parties immediately appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of
California.' 9 That court affirmed that the Davis admissions policy
was unconstitutional. 2 0 This led Davis to appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bakke is difficult to decipher
because it contained so many separate opinions. The basic holding
was that quotas are not allowed in admission policies but that the
consideration of race more generally might be. ' Thus, the Davis
policy was unconstitutional, but the Court left open the possibility
22
that admissions policies could consider race absent such quotas.
Finally, and most important to Bakke himself, he was admitted to
23
He is currently a practicing
Davis for medical school.
24
anesthesiologist in Minnesota.
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Ann Hopkins was by all accounts a success, a woman who had an
impressive, loving husband, three kids, and an enviable career at a
major accounting firm. Her world came crashing down, however,
when her firm denied her a partnership, her husband divorced her, and
she lost one of her children in a drunk-driving accident.25 Hopkins
survived all of these moments and is still with us today. Most notably
for purposes of this Essay, she also became the subject of one of the
most defining Title VII cases involving gender discrimination in the
employment context.26

18 Id.

19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 162.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 208-09.
See id. at 209.
Id. at 220.
See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 GEO.

L.J. 981, 981 (1999).
25 Ann Hopkins, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Personal Account of a Sexual
DiscriminationPlaintiff 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 360-61, 414 (2005).
26 Cheryl A. Pilate, Comment, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Mixed Outcome for
Title VII Mixed-Motive Plaintiffs, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 107, 108 (1989) ("Amid the rapid
razing of established civil rights law, one case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, emerged as a

lone victory." (footnotes omitted)).
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Hopkins was a successful career woman. She worked at IBM
before joining Touche Ross & Co., which was then one of the "Big
f 27 She met her husband at Touche,
Eight" national accounting firms.
and when they married, she agreed to leave the firm to avoid any
issues with the firm's nepotism policy.28 She joined a Touche
competitor, Price Waterhouse, as a consultant. 29 In the meantime, her
husband became a partner at Touche. 30 Hopkins worked in the Office
31
She immediately set
of Government Services at Price Waterhouse.
herself apart by being a key player in securing what was then the
largest consulting project the firm had ever undertaken.32 After five
33
successful years at Price Waterhouse, Hopkins went up for partner.
34
She did not succeed. At first, she was told that the firm would hold
her.partnership over for another year, but that next year, she was told
that she would never make partner. 35 This rejection occurred in spite
of deep support from the partners who had worked with Hopkins
36
Their
because the other partners strongly disapproved of her.
by
accompanied
was
application
partnership
of
her
rejection
a
being
for
comments like the following: she "overcompensated
37
woman," was "macho," and needed "a course at charm school."
The partners also noted that she was "[o]verly aggressive, unduly
harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff' and that she
was "[u]niversally disliked."3 8 When she was told she was going to
be held over, her strongest supporter advised that she "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 3 9

27 Hopkins, supranote 25, at 358.
28 Id. at 359.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31

Id.

32 Id. at 360.
33 Joel Win. Friedman, Gender Noncomformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 205, 211 (2007).
34 Id.
35

Id. at 211-12.

36 Id. at 211.
37 Id.
38 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 361.
39 Friedman, supra note 33, at 212.
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Hopkins sued. She alleged that Price Waterhouse excluded her
from partnership "because of her sex" and that such treatment led to
her constructive discharge in violation of Title VII. 4 0 In federal court,
the district judge presiding over Hopkins's case determined that
gender stereotyping had contributed to the denial of Hopkins's bid for
partnership; however, the judge also found that the firm had
legitimate reasons for the denial. 4' Ultimately, the judge determined
that reliance on even some of the partners' sexist comments was
enough to show Price Waterhouse's liability under Title VII. 42 The
problem for Hopkins was that the district court judge rejected her
argument that she had been constructively discharged, so she did not
receive back pay, nor was she rehired.43 Instead, the judge ordered
Price Waterhouse only to pay attorneys' fees.4 4 Both parties
appealed.45
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed
with the liability result. The D.C. Circuit took issue with how the
46
district court had handled the burdens of proof, however.
The
appellate court argued that if the defendant employer were able to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the
same employment decision even without the discriminatory
considerations, then that would be a complete defense to liability.4 7
(The trial court had held that such a defense would act only as a
limitation on the remedy a plaintiff could recover, not a complete
defense.) Ultimately, this did not matter because the appellate court
determined that regardless of whether the "same decision" defense
was complete or not, Price Waterhouse had not met its burden in
48
showing this defense. Price Waterhouse appealed.
At the Supreme Court, the only issue for review was how the
burden of proof would be allocated in what became known as
49
"mixed-motive" employment dis6rimination cases.
Such cases
40 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177. Hopkins also alleged violations of the District of
Columbia Human Rights Act. Infra Appendix B, p. 1178.
41 Friedman, supra note 33, at 212.
42

Id.

43 Id.

46

Id.
See id.
Id.

47

Id.

44

45

Id.
49 Id. at 213.
48

HeinOnline -- 90 Or. L. Rev. 1154 2011-2012

What Ifr: A Study of Seminal Cases as ifDecided
Under a Twombly/Iqbal Regime

2012]

1155

involved a potentially legitimate reason for the adverse employment
decision, as well as a discriminatory one.so The Supreme Court did
not reach a definitive conclusion, but the Court did resolve some
issues. Essentially, the Court determined that in mixed-motive cases,
the plaintiff had to show that sex played a role in the adverse
employment decision.5 ' Once the plaintiff made that showing, the
burden shifted to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision even without
52
The most lasting effect of this
that discriminatory consideration.
case, however, was that the Court explicitly recognized that gender
stereotyping could evidence discrimination.
Following the Supreme Court's decision, Hopkins's case was
remanded back down to the district court.5 4 Hopkins won. Price
Waterhouse rehired her as a partner and paid all of her back pay and
attorneys' fees.5 5 She remained a partner for seven years, then took a
56
different position in the firm, only to retire about four years later.
57
She now writes and speaks around the world about her case.
The case itself now has only limited precedential value.5 s In 1991,
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which clarified the
5
plaintiffs burden in mixed-motive cases 9 and reversed the Court's
treatment of the employer's same decision defense.60 Nonetheless,
the case still stands as precedent for the notion that "nonconformity to

5o Pilate, supra note 26, at 114.
51 The plurality would have required that the plaintiff show that the prohibited
consideration of sex was a "motivating" factor in the employment decision while two
concurring Justices would have required a showing that the prohibited consideration of sex
was a "substantial factor" in the employment decision. Id. at 114-15.
52 Id. at 114.
53 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 364.
54 Id. at 364-65.
55 Id. at 365.
56 See id. at 410-11.

57

Id. at 414.

58 Friedman, supra note 33, at 214. "[Tlhe case's precedential value appears to have
evaporated." Id.
59 Congress adopted the plurality's test requiring "that the plaintiff need only establish
that sex or some other forbidden factor was a motivating factor for the employer's
challenged action." Id. at 213-14.
60 The defense is still shown by a preponderance of the evidence standard, but it does
not operate as a complete defense. Id. at 213.
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gendered expectations can constitute a form of statutorily proscribed
sex-based discrimination.', 6 1
II
THE ARGUMENT: BAKKE AND PRICE WA TERHOUSE MIGHT NOT HAVE
SURVIVED UNDER TWOMBL Y AND IQBAL

Pleading under the FederalRules of Civil Procedurehad been in a
fairly steady state for over fifty years when the Supreme Court
162 On its face, the
decided the case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.62
case did not portend that it would reset procedural doctrine regarding
pleading: it was an antitrust case brought by plaintiffs who believed
that the "Baby Bells," who in spite of being broken into separate
regional companies, conspired with one another to keep out
63
The Court determined that the case should have been
competitors.
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 64 Under
antitrust law, the plaintiffs would ultimately have to prove more than
65
mere parallel behavior.
They would have to show that the parties
actively colluded, and because the allegations in the complaint did not
allege more than the conclusory allegation of "unlawful conduct," the
The Court refused to infer from the
complaint could not survive.
facts pled-simple parallel behavior-the possibility of an antitrust
67
It raised the consequences of wasteful litigation and "in
violation.
terrorem" discovery to argue that complaints, while still governed by
Rule 8, required more than just conclusory allegations to move
68
forward in litigation. Most importantly, the Court "retired" the oftrelied-on "no set of facts" language from Conley v. Gibson.69
Less than two years after Twombly was decided, the Court came
down with another pleading opinion, Ashcroft v. Iqbal.70 In that case,
Id. at 219.
62 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Court had in fact reaffirmed the basic tenets of notice
pleading in two modem cases, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002),
and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
63 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51.
6 See id. at 554.
61

65 Id.
66

Id. at 556.

67 Id.

68 Id. at 557-58.

69 Id. at 561-63 (discussing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
70 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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the Court reaffirmed Twombly." It found that Iqbal's allegations of
discrimination by government officials like John Ashcroft and Robert
Mueller were not plausible based on what was pled in Iqbal's
72
According to the Court, rather than actively
complaint.
discriminating against individuals of Arab and/or Muslim descent in
the aftermath of 9/11, it was more plausible that these government
officials were acting in good faith in their law enforcement capacity. 7 3
The Court also clarified the test for reviewing complaints. First, a
court must strike all conclusory allegations that are not supported by
well-pleaded facts; a court does not have to accept the allegations as
true.7 4 Second, a court must review what remains of the complaint in
order to determine whether the well-pleaded facts state a plausible
claim for relief. 75 Notably, plausibility is determined on the basis of a
judge's "judicial experience and common sense." 7 6
Following these two decisions, there has been continued and
spirited debate about how the cases will be used by courts. There is
substantial discretion built into the standard-"judicial experience
and common sense" is an invitation to use one's own judgment about
the plausibility of a claim. Thus, it is no surprise that district and
In other
appellate court decisions to date are all over the map.
words, across the judiciary, judges are reading and applying Twombly
and Iqbal differently. It is with this discretion and variance in mind
71 Id. at 1949.
72 Id. at 1951.
73 Id. at 1951-52.
74
Id. at 1949-51.
75 Id.

76 Id. at 1950.

77 See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (interpreting
the plausibility standard to mean that a "court will ask itself could these things have
happened, not did they happen"); Ruston v. Town Bd. of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 824 (2010) (holding that plaintiffs bringing an equal
protection claim failed to allege facts that "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief'
because they did not allege "specific examples" of superior treatment to those "similarly
situated" with respect to housing development applications); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel &
Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that "[e]xactly how implausible
is 'implausible' remains to be seen, as such a malleable standard will have to be worked
out in practice"); Mehrhoff v. William Floyd Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 04-CV3850(JS)(MLO), 2009 WL 5219019, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009) (finding a "plausible
Section 1983 discrimination claim, although . . . 'actual proof of those facts is improbable,
and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely,"' when a plaintiff alleged that the defendants
intentionally wrote false negative performance reviews and threatened to reveal her sexual
orientation).
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that this Essay analyzes the complaints in Bakke and Price
Waterhouse.
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The complaint in Bakke is all of four pages in length. It contains
only four paragraphs of factual allegations. His sparse complaint
stated that he had not been admitted to medical school because other
applicants had been admitted under "separate segregated admission
procedures" that used "separate standards."7 8 He even had some facts
to back up these statements-an account that sixteen of the one
hundred applicants admitted were from this "separate" pool. 7 9 Yet,
Bakke's claim of discrimination would ultimately require him to
prove that he was an otherwise-qualified applicant for admission to
medical school. On that count, Bakke's complaint stated an arguably
conclusory allegation-he claimed that he was a "qualified" applicant
without providing facts to make that a plausible claim.
In other
words, he did not state his scores, nor did he articulate where he
ranked in the admissions pool.
This statement that Bakke was a qualified applicant is similar to the
allegation made in Twombly. In that case, the Court held that merely
alleging parallel conduct, without more, was not enough. The
plaintiff had to plead facts showing that there was collusion or an
agreement to conspire.8 1 The Court determined that the plaintiffs
would ultimately have to prove the collusion, so in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs similarly had to allege something more
than just a conclusory allegation of collusion. 82 They had to give
some facts. 83
Like the plaintiffs in Twombly, Bakke also failed to provide any
facts to back up his conclusory allegation that he was a "qualified"
applicant. Given this unsupported conclusory allegation, if a court
today were reviewing this complaint, it might very well dismiss the
case. A court may have determined that Bakke had not stated a
plausible claim because he had nothing but a bare allegation of his
qualifications as a medical school candidate. Thus, regardless of
78 Infra Appendix A, p. 1172.
79 Infra Appendix A, p. 1172.
80 Infra Appendix A, p. 1172.

81Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).

82 Id.
83 Id.
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whether there was a separate race-based admission standard, Bakke
himself had not suffered discrimination. Without any facts, a court
might have determined that a more plausible story was that he simply
did not qualify under the medical school's standards for admission.
He might not have been admitted because he was just not good
enough.
This, in fact, looks to be the case with Bakke. Almost fifty medical
candidates with scores superior to Bakke were also denied admission,
meaning that even if the sixteen spots had not been set aside for
84
minority candidates, he still might not have been admitted.
In
addition, some white students who had scores lower than Bakke had
been admitted through the standard admissions process, so even
assuming he was qualified, he was not necessarily pushed out by the
minority applicants.
Thus, based on a judge's judicial experience
and common sense, she might have determined that without any facts
to show that Bakke might have otherwise been admitted, she could
infer only that he was not admitted because he was not qualified. The
conclusory statement that he was in fact qualified would not have to
be accepted as true.
One notable wrinkle in this argument is that, in the actual case,
Davis stipulated that Bakke would have been admitted were it not for
its special admissions policy.86 Davis apparently conceded this point
so that it could quickly reach the merits of whether its admissions
This is why the case
policy would survive constitutional scrutiny.
never went to trial, but was instead decided by a judge based on
So, it could be that even if Twombly and lqbal
stipulated facts.
were in effect in 1974, Davis would still not have moved to dismiss.
If the purpose of the case was to resolve the constitutionality of its
admissions policy, then perhaps Davis would not have bothered with
such a motion. However, under Conley, there is no doubt that
Bakke's complaint would have survived scrutiny, so if Davis wanted
to challenge Bakke's qualifications for admission, that challenge
would have come up much later, either on a motion for summary
judgment or at trial. It is hard to know for sure, but Davis might have

84 See Selmi, supra note 24, at 986.
85 See id.
86

Id.

87 Id.
88 Id.
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resisted pursuing the issue of Bakke's qualifications because of the
cost associated with discovery and a summary judgment motion
and/or trial. Davis's calculus might have been quite different if it
could have successfully resolved the case much earlier on a motion to
dismiss.
Of course, if Davis were so set on testing the
constitutionality of its admissions policy, it might still have stipulated
that Bakke was qualified. There is an argument, however, that Davis
might have moved to dismiss this case and "tested" its policy with a
different plaintiff and a different set of facts.
Another wrinkle is that even if the complaint had been dismissed,
Bakke may have been able to cure the complaint by amending it to
add well-pleaded facts. After all, he knew what his test scores and
past grade point averages were and presumably he could have
included those qualifications in the complaint. Yet, it is unlikely that
he knew his relative place in the applicant pool. He would have
needed that information to ultimately prove that, were it not for the
special admissions program, he would have been admitted. Davis
held that information, and the easiest way for Bakke to obtain it was
by filing his complaint and proceeding with discovery. If a judge
used Twombly and Iqbal to argue that Bakke did not plead enough
facts for her to plausibly infer that, without regard to race, Bakke was
qualified to gain entry into Davis Medical School's one hundred
spots, his complaint would have been dismissed. And, without the
additional information that he would have found if he were allowed to
conduct discovery, it is not clear that he could have cured his
complaint. He would have needed discovery or access to information
through other channels. He might have found that information
through a friendly source on the admissions committee, but it is
unlikely. Thus, there is a good argument that if his complaint were
dismissed on these grounds, he would not have been able to cure it.
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
When Hopkins filed her complaint, she had limited information.
She believed that she had not been made a partner at Price
Waterhouse because of gender stereotypes, but she had little evidence
that this was the case. Her complaint demonstrates as much. She set
the groundwork by detailing her accomplishments at Price
Waterhouse and by noting that only five of the firm's six hundred
partners were women. 89 But, when it came to noting why she thought
89Infra Appendix B, pp. 1175-76.
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she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex, the only fact
she had was that an employee at Price Waterhouse had told her to
"'soften' her image" by "wear[ing] make-up and styl[ing] her hair." 90
In order to ultimately prove her case, she would have to show that
improper gender stereotypes played some role in the decision not to
elevate her to partner. The only fact she pleaded regarding a gender
stereotype was the comment about softening her image.
Because Price Waterhouse was a discrimination case, it is most
analogous to Iqbal. In that case, Iqbal alleged that he had been
detained and treated poorly because of his national origin.9 ' The
majority in Iqbal rejected Iqbal's argument that Ashcroft and Mueller
had discriminated against Iqbal because he failed to allege facts
making it plausible that such discrimination occurred.92 Instead, the
Court determined that the plausible (and legal) reason that Iqbal was
arrested was because of a legitimate law enforcement response to a
93
The fact that Iqbal had pleaded that a
threat of terrorist attacks.
large proportion of the men arrested in this sweep were of Arab
and/or Muslim descent, and that Iqbal was subject to torture and
conduct that indicated discrimination against Arab and Muslim
individuals, was not enough for the majority of the Court.94 In the
same way, a judge using Twombly and Iqbal to evaluate Hopkins's
complaint could have determined that the lack of facts pleaded
regarding gender stereotypes meant that the more plausible reason for
the denial of her partnership was merit based. One comment about
softening her image did not necessarily mean that she was denied
promotion because of gender stereotypes. In other words, a judge
using her common sense and judicial experience might have
determined that there were not enough well-pleaded facts to
demonstrate the plausibility of Hopkins's claim. Of course, a judge
might have inferred that the comment regarding Hopkins's image,
when juxtaposed with her excellent qualifications, meant that she
might have been denied partnership because of gender stereotypes.
But, because the facts pleaded regarding gender stereotypes were thin,
if not nonexistent, a judge could have refused to make this inference,

90 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177.
91 Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
92 Id. at 1952.
93Id. at 1951-53.
94 Id.
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instead opting for the more plausible inference that the promotion
decision was legitimate.
This means that the issue of her qualifications for partnership
would have been important. If she was so obviously qualified for
partnership, then a judge might have determined that there was no
legitimate reason for denying her promotion. Here, like Bakke's
complaint, Hopkins alleged that she was "qualified" for partnership.9 5
In fact, she took it one step further and alleged that she might have
even been "more qualified" than some of the men who were promoted
to partnership the same year that she was up.9 6 Unlike Bakke,
Hopkins did not rest on conclusory statements of her qualifications
vis-a-vis other partnership candidates. The problem is that the facts
she pleaded did not necessarily demonstrate anything definitive about
her qualifications. She noted that "of the three men . . . who became

partners.in [Hopkins's] office [the year she applied], one had worked
for [Price Waterhouse] for less time than [Hopkins] had, while
another had served as [Hopkins's] subordinate." 9 7 These facts are
interesting, but they did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Hopkins was as or more qualified than the men who obtained
partnership. Similarly, the sections of the complaint that directly
quoted positive reviews of her work did not help. Two of the quotes
are from partners who knew her and were on record as being'
supportive of her work. 9 8 The other quote is from a client, but it did
not speak of Hopkins directly. 9 9 It lauded "all members of the project
team."' 00 Taking all of these facts as true, as a judge still must do
even under Twombly and Iqbal, would not do any work for Hopkins.
The facts do not lead to the conclusion that she was denied
partnership because of gender stereotypes. They simply show that
some partners thought she was qualified for partnership, while others
did not.' 0 1 Again, a judge using her judicial experience and common
95 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177.
96 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177.
97 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177.

98 See infra Appendix B, p. 1176.
99 See infra Appendix B, p. 1176.
100 Infra Appendix B, p. 1176.
101In the partnership process at Price Waterhouse, there was no real formula.

A
candidate with a number of positive comments would not necessarily be granted a
partnership and a person who had a number of negative comments was not necessarily
defeated. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232-33 (1989). There were also no
limits placed on the number of employees who could become partners. Id. at 233. The
number varied year to year.
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sense would know that in hiring and promotion decisions, people
disagree about the merits of a candidate. Disagreement about the
merits is not necessarily motivated by discriminatory intent, and
without more facts showing such intent, a judge could conclude that
the plausible reason for Hopkins's failed attempt for partnership was
based only on merit.
As with Bakke's case, there is a question as to whether Hopkins
might have been able to cure her complaint by amending it to add
more facts. Those facts were out there-the comments about her
being "macho" and needing a course in "charm school" were certainly
probative of gender stereotypes. The question is whether she had
access to those comments prior to filing her complaint. In Hopkins's
own personal account, she wrote that many of these comments were
read to her by a senior partner.102 It is unclear from her account,
however, whether she had physical custody of the partner reviews. It
is also unclear from her personal account whether she remembered
those statements from her meeting with her senior partner or whether
she had remembered them from the entirety of the litigation process.
Her lawyer certainly did not include any of those statements in the
complaint, so it is likely that she did not remember the statements and
even more likely that she did not have physical copies of them.
Instead, she probably got the evaluations and statements through
discovery. Thus, had her complaint not survived a motion to dismiss,
she never would have gained access to this information. Again, like
Bakke's complaint, if the court had granted a motion to dismiss in
Hopkins's case, it is unlikely that she could have amended her
complaint to add the well-pleaded facts necessary to successfully state
a claim under Twombly and Iqbal.
III
WHAT IF?

Like George Bailey, this Essay has been thrust into the "what if'
scenario. Under Twombly and Iqbal, it is very possible that Bakke,
Price Waterhouse, and other similarly seminal cases might not have
survived a motion to dismiss. The next question is how would life be
different if these kinds of cases were unsuccessful?

102 Hopkins,

supra note 25, at 361.
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A. Elimination of InstitutionalPlaintiffs and Defendants?
Litigation has become a tool for initiating and implementing social
change. Because of the power of litigation, there are a number of
interest groups, nonprofits, think tanks, and other organizations that
have a vested interest in certain litigation matters. These interests
have led to an institutionalization of litigants. In other words, there is
a business aspect to all litigation, even litigation about social change.
Organizations supporting such litigation often handpick the proper
plaintiff or plaintiffs. For example, in the litigation challenging
California's referendum banning gay marriage, the plaintiffs were
carefully chosen.10 3 They were two upstanding, white, gay couples,
who would not distract from the substantive issues in the case, and if
anything, would just help the cause. As one commentator described,
"It isn't easy to find the right plaintiffs for a high-profile
constitutional case. There have been plaintiffs before the Supreme
Court who made moving and stalwart examples of the 1principle
they
04
were upholding, and plaintiffs who faltered on the job."
The use of litigation to promote social change grew from the
increasing success of such litigation from the mid-1950s and
beyond. 0 5 Once it was clear that courts were a viable vehicle for
such change, when legislation or some other mode of change might
not have been, planning and, more importantly, money started to
funnel toward litigation and litigation strategy. However, what if
litigation like Bakke's had not been successful? What if Bakke's
complaint had been dismissed and he had not been able to amend it?
If that kind of litigation had not worked, perhaps groups like the
ACLU or the Manhattan Institute would not be as powerful as they
are today. And, even if those types of groups were relatively as
prominent, they might not have been so in the litigation context.
Bakke presents an interesting case because it was solely defended
by the lawyers hired by the public institution defendant, the
103See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40.
104Id. at 44. Finding plaintiffs is a difficult task. For example, one of the most wellknown and controversial plaintiffs is Norma McCorvey, the plaintiff in the landmark case
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). McCorvey has since come out in opposition to
legalized abortions and has most recently made a cameo appearance in film about
abortion. See Paul Bond, Roe v. Wade PlaintiffStars in Abortion-Themed Film, REUTERS,

May 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/06/us-janeroe-idUSTRE7450D020
110506. Depending on one's ideological stance, McCorvey is now lionized or demonized.
105Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid

V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection

Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443, 444-46 (2001).
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University of California at Davis. Interest groups like the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund filed amici briefs, but the groups
were not directly involved in the litigation in any meaningful way.' 0 6
Thus, with Bakke on one side and the Davis Medical School on the
other, the litigation was notably lacking in anyone to represent the
real issue in the case, namely the interests of minorities who might
benefit from Davis's (and other similar) admissions policies. Because
of this lack of representation and because of some questionable moves
by Davis, 0 7 Davis's integrity in the litigation was challenged.' 0 8
Detractors argued that Davis did not pursue the case as well as others
could, that Davis hoped it would lose, and that while Davis hired
generalized constitutional experts, Davis did not hire those who
specialized in civil rights litigation.109 The "loss" of Bakke arguably
motivated liberal interest groups to more carefully craft their litigation
and select their representative plaintiffs. In other words, had interest
groups been more involved in Bakke as the case developed, the
groups might not have stipulated as to Bakke's qualifications, waiting
instead for a more "winnable" case against a different plaintiff.
A similar controversy has brewed over the gay marriage ban in
California. Interest groups have heavily debated what the strategy for
litigation should be, and many pro-gay-marriage groups have argued
that challenging the California referendum all the way to the Supreme
Court at this point in time is a grave mistake. 1 o The difference
between the California case and Bakke, however, is that the lawyers
in the California case have actively listened to these groups. The
lawyers and interest groups have largely agreed to disagree, but the
strategy meetings and debates have taken place.1 1 That was not the
case with Bakke, and it is worth thinking about how the success of
cases like Bakke and others have led to this "institutionalization" of
litigation. Further, it is worth thinking about whether the way
litigation is controlled by particular groups with broad agenda
106 See Selmi, supra note 24, at 988-91; Williams, supra note 16, at 181-82.

107 For example, Davis never brought up the involvement of one of its employees, Peter
Storandt. Storandt was an administrator in the medical school who all but encouraged
Bakke to file his case. Williams, supra note 16, at 139. Some have alleged that this was
an improper action for an agent of the medical school to take. Id. at 140-41.
1os Id. at 182-84.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Chuleenan Svetvilas, ChallengingProp. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAW.,

Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid=1.
III Id.

HeinOnline -- 90 Or. L. Rev. 1165 2011-2012

1166

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 1147

motives is a good thing. And, finally, if cases like Bakke had not
been successful and thus had not led to the creation of these litigation
interests, how would those now-established litigation interests be
affected? Will current Bakke-like cases be able to survive a motion to
dismiss? And, if not, what will happen to the institutions that have
Perhaps the
become so powerful in the litigation context?
institutionalization of litigation is so entrenched that it will survive the
change to pleading standards. But, perhaps it will not.
B. Substantive Differences in Development of the Law?
One undeniable effect of the loss of cases like Bakke and Price
Waterhouse is that the legal change they affected would have been
lost. The question is whether another case would have filled that
void, or whether the law would have developed on a completely
different trajectory.
It is possible that had Bakke not been successful another white
candidate for a spot in a graduate or post-graduate institution would
have reached the same result through litigation. The real question is
whether any such plaintiff would have had access to the information
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. It is possible that a plaintiff
could have accessed that information by requesting the records
directly from the institution, by hiring a private investigator, or by
getting them from a disgruntled employee. But, the prospect of losing
the motion or spending the time and money to get the information
through other means might have actually chilled all litigation in this
context.
So, how else might the Bakkes of the world have found relief?
They might have been able to garner enough political strength to
initiate legislative change. It is difficult to say whether they would
have been successful and what such success might have looked like.
Given that affirmative action is still a controversial and seemingly
insurmountable issue, it seems unlikely that they could have obtained
satisfactory relief. And, even if they could, it is similarly difficult to
know what that relief would look like. Because a case like Bakke led
to additional Supreme Court cases like Grutter v. Bollinger and
others, Congress has seemed to stay out of the fray.' 1 2 It might have
112 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a law school admissions
program that gave special consideration for being a certain racial minority did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Selmi, supra note 24, at 1019-20 (noting that
despite an increasing hostility to affirmative action in recent years, "legislatures-
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been different if the Court was unable to take on a case like Bakke or
Grutter. In that situation, Congress may have been able to do
something completely different, perhaps better clarifying how race
could factor into admissions policies or perhaps muddying the waters
even more.
C. Role ofLawyers as Elements of Social Change?
It is common to think of lawyers as an integral element of social
change-on the bench, in the courtroom, as lobbyists, and as
legislators, lawyers move social policy. 113 Lawyers have used the
civil justice system as a major mode of social change.11 But, what if
that mode was closed off because cases, at least many in the civil
rights context, might not have survived a motion to dismiss? Lawyers
work for social change beyond the courtroom, of course, but if this
mode of change were closed to certain kinds of cases, how would
lawyering be different?
As discussed earlier, institutions like the ACLU or the Manhattan
Institute might not have developed such a presence in litigation.
Lawyers are a part of these institutions, but if litigation were not a
mode of social change, perhaps these institutions would be heavily
populated by policymakers, not by lawyers. And perhaps many of
those in the profession who chose that career path because of their
potential role in moving social policy would have made different
choices. It is difficult to say how the profession would have been
affected. But in the very least, if litigation like Bakke's and
Hopkins's had not been successful, lawyers might not have been
viewed as professionals who could change social dynamics in our
society. Thus, the profession might have had a very different selfidentity without the ability to successfully pursue cases like Bakke
and Price Waterhouse. Moreover, if similar cases are closed off
today under a Twombly/Iqbal regime, the legal profession and its
identity might transform into one that no longer values its impact on
social change.

particularly Congress-have expressed surprisingly little interest in revisiting or revising
affirmative action programs").
113 Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 2000-01 (2004).
114 Cummings & Eagly, supra note 105, at 444-50.
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D. Access to Justice?
If lawyers no longer facilitated social change, how might
marginalized individuals have been affected? Many of the cases that
were successful in a pre-Twombly/Iqbal regime were brought by
individuals seeking relief against strong adversaries and with all the
odds against them. Ideologically, one might agree or disagree with
the positions taken in Bakke and Price Waterhouse, but because of a
generous pleading standard, the plaintiffs were able to seek and find
relief for their alleged grievances. Their success largely hinged on
their ability to find lawyers to take their cases-lawyers who must
have believed that the complaints they would draft would survive
motions to dismiss. As already discussed, the regime is now one in
which certain kinds of claims are significantly less likely to survive to
a motion to dismiss. This means that similar claims today brought by
similarly marginalized people are less likely to succeed and that
lawyers today will be less likely to take a chance on such claims.
This is not meant to argue that access to justice is cut off simply
because of Twombly and Iqbal. It is far more complicated than thatlegal aid is dwindling, corporate power is growing, and a plethora of
other factors contribute to this phenomenon. However, the pleading
regime under Twombly and Iqbal has certainly contributed to the
decline in access to justice. It is anecdotal at best, but as this Essay
discusses, individuals who sought access to justice against many odds
succeeded under a more generous regime. Today, those individuals
would be unlikely to bring their claims and even less likely to find a
lawyer to help them do so.
E. More Nuanced Development of the Law?
The effect of the institutionalization of litigation is that the law
tends to develop in a forced fashion. In other words, there are not as
many organic moments because institutionalized plaintiffs and
defendants control the mainstays of litigation. Continuing on with the
"what if' question, if cases like Bakke and Price Waterhouse would
have failed, meaning institutionalized litigation would not have the
force it does today, does that mean that all civil rights litigation would
have ceased? Or, does it mean that the litigation would have
developed more organically? Instead of one chosen case making its
way to the Supreme Court, perhaps a number of different cases with
nuanced facts would have percolated at the district court and appellate
court level. The Supreme Court might have stepped in only once a
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divide arose in the development of those cases. In other words,
perhaps the development of the law might have been less orchestrated
by institutional players.
A related effect of an organic development of the law might be
greater societal trust in the institutions that produce that law. If a
number of individuals are seeking and finding relief in the courts and
nuanced legal doctrine flows from their cases, then individuals
looking in on that litigation might have greater faith in the courts.
People who look like them are seeking and finding relief; it is not a
"representative" moment when a person who has nothing in common
with them is chosen by an institution to represent a cause.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how individuals could have
succeeded in much of the seminal litigation over the last fifty years,
even in a pre-Twombly/Iqbal regime. The resource disparities were,
and still are, quite vast between an individual plaintiff and an
organizational defendant. Moreover, many of these individuals are
already marginalized and lack access to other modes of remedy like
legislative change through Congress. Thus, the loss of cases like
Bakke and Price Waterhouse might have instead meant the further
marginalization of similarly situated people. In the current context of
Twombly and Iqbal, it is even more difficult to see how an individual
plaintiff would be able to surmount these challenges. So, while the
use of those cases in the past might have prevented the development
of institutionalized litigation, Twombly and Iqbal would have
prevented success by individual plaintiffs as well. Time will tell what
the impact of these cases will be on these types of plaintiffs going
forward." 5
CONCLUSION

This Essay is only the beginning of a longer and larger
conversation about how cases like Twombly and Iqbal have changed
the legal landscape. It is hardly an exhaustive treatment of the "what
if' question, but it provides a place to start. In thinking about other
seminal cases that are taken for granted, it is worth thinking further
about whether those cases would survive if they were brought today.
With respect to the group of cases that this Essay has collected, the
Cases that have defined rights for
answer is generally no.

115 See Brooke Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff,SETON HALL L. REv. (forthcoming
2012), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1 908359.
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individuals-rights that many still hold dear, whether they consider
themselves ideologically conservative or liberal-would likely not
have been decided on the merits under a Twombly/Iqbal regime. The
deeper and more disturbing question to ask now is, what cases and
rights are going to be sacrificed in the future? This isn't It's a
Wonderful Life, so Clarence cannot provide the answer. And, because
the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard is likely to defeat filed cases, or
chill their filings from the outset, the answer might be unknowable.
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APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YOLO
ALLAN BAKKE,

)

Petitioner and
Plaintiff

)
)

vs

)

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY)
OF CALIFORNIA
)
Defendants and
Respondents

No. 31287
COMPLAINT
FOR

)

_MANDATORY

)
)

INJUNCTIVE,
AND

)
)

DECLARATORY
RELIEF

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Petitioner and plaintiff ALLAN BAKKE (hereinafter called
plaintiff) alleges for a first cause of action:
1.
That plaintiff is a citizen of the State of California and of the
United States of America.
II.
That defendants and respondents The Regents of the University of
California (hereinafter called defendants) are public officers of the
State of California, maintaining, operating and administrating the
School of Medicine, University of California, Davis, Yolo County,
California (hereinafter called said Medical School); that said Medical
School is supported by public funds and tax monies and receives
federal financial assistance.
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III.
That plaintiff duly and timely filed his applications with said
Medical School for admission to the first-year classes of said Medical
School commencing in September 1973, and September 1974; that in
each year, respectively, plaintiff received notification from said
Medical School that his applications were denied.

IV.
That plaintiff was and is in all respects duly qualified for admission
to said Medical School and the sole reason his applications were
rejected was on account of his race, to-wit, Caucasian or white, and
not for reasons applicable to persons of every race, as follows:
That a special admissions committee composed of racial minority
members evaluated applications of special group of persons purand educationally disadvantaged
portedly from economic
a quota of 16%, or 16 out of 100
this
group
from
backgrounds; that
first-year class members, was selected; that in fact, all applicants
admitted to said Medical School as members of this group were
members of racial minorities; that under this admission program
racial minority and majority applicants went through separate
segregated admission procedures with separate standards for
admissions; that the use of such separate standards resulted in the
admission of minority applicants less qualified than plaintiff and other
non-minority applicants who were therefore rejected.
V.
That by reason of the action of defendants in excluding plaintiff
from the first-year Medical School class under defendants' minority
preference admission program plaintiff has been invidiously
discriminated against on account of his race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the California
Constitution (Art. 1, sec. 21), and the Federal Civil Rights Act (42
U.S.C. sec. 200(d)).

VI.
That plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff alleges for a second cause of action:
I.
Plaintiff realleges and incorporates therein by reference each and
every allegation contained in Paragraphs I through VI of his first
cause of action set forth above.
II.
That plaintiff will suffer substantial and irreparable harm by reason
of the continued refusal of defendants to admit him to said Medical
School.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff alleges for a third cause of action:
I.
Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference each and
every allegation contained in Paragraphs I through VI of his first
cause of action set forth above.
II.
That a bonafide and genuine dispute exists between Plaintiff, on
the one hand, and, defendants, on the other hand, as to plaintiff's right
to be admitted to said Medical School.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays:
1. That this Court issue its alternate writof mandate directing
defendants to admit plaintiff to said Medical School, or to appear
before the above entitled Court and show cause why said
admission to said Medical School may be denied plaintiff.
2. That the above entitled Court issue its order directing
defendants to appear and show cause why they should not be
enjoined during the pendency of this action and permanently from
denying plaintiff admission to said Medical School.
3. That this Court enter its judgment declaring that plaintiff is
entitled to admission to said Medical School; and, further
declaring, that defendants are lawfully obligated to admit plaintiff
to said Medical School.
4. For such other and further relief as to this Court may seem
proper.

eyn

d H. Colvin
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B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
ANN B. HOPKINS
2134 Cathedral Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Civil Action No.

1801 K Street, N.M.
Washington, D.C. 20006

1. This is an action for relief from violations of rights secured by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et
seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code 12501 et se. This Court has jurisdiction over the Title VII claims
under 42 U.S.C. 2000e- 5(f)(3) and has pendent jurisdiction over the
District of Columbia claims.
2. Plaintiff Ann B. Hopkins is a female citizen of the United States
and a resident of the District of Columbia.
3. Defendant Price Waterhouse is. a partnership that operates
nationwide, specializing in providing management and accounting
services to private corporations and governmental agencies on a
contract basis. Defendant engages in business and maintains offices
within the District of Columbia. Defendant is an employer within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(b) and D.C. Code 1-2502(10).
4. In August 1978, defendant hired plaintiff as a manager in
Washington, D.C. in the Office of Government Services within
defendant's Department of Management Advisory Services. This
office's mission is to secure and manage contracts with Federal
agencies. At the time of her hire, plaintiff had extensive experience in
the areas of management consulting, systems analysis and
management.
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5. After being employed by defendant, plaintiff was responsible for
securing millions of dollars worth of new business for the firm. For
example, plaintiffs work on her initial assignment resulted in the
award of two contracts of approximately $200,000 each from the
Department of Interior, one of which she later managed. Plaintiff next
turned to the Department of State, where she was responsible for
developing a proposal that led to the award of a $1.2 million contract
to compete with another firm in designing State's financial
management system. Plaintiff then successfully managed defendant's
entry in this competition, and the result was a $17 million contract
with State to implement a financial management system worldwide.
The partner-in-charge of plaintiffs office has estimated the long-term
value of this contract at $35 million.
6. Following the events outlined in Paragraph 5, plaintiff was
responsible for developing the proposals that led to two other awards:
a $6 million contract with the Department of State to implement a
worldwide real property management system, and a $2.5 million
contract with the Department of Agriculture to design an automated
accounting system for recording and tracking loans to farmers. When
the latter contract was awarded, the partner-in-charge of plaintiffs
office wrote on December 2, 1982 to the head of defendant in New
York that "Ann Hopkins has done it again!"
7. In 1982 plaintiff was assigned responsibility for managing the real
property management system project that she had developed for the
Department of State. In addition, she was assigned responsibility for
managing the Word Processing Department within her office. Both
assignments were at a level of responsibility customarily given to
partners, although plaintiff remained a senior manager. Plaintiff
handled both assignments in a fully satisfactory manner.
8. Defendant is a large firm with over 600 partners nationwide,
including more than 30 in Washington, D.C. The firm also employs
other professionals, such as plaintiff, as well as paraprofessional and
clerical employees. As of July 1, 1983, five of defendant's partners
were women, and there were no female partners in Washington, D. C.
Of the approximately 100 partners in plaintiff's department nationally
(Management Advisory Services), only one was a woman.
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9. In the autumn of 1982, plaintiff was fully qualified for
partnership with defendant, as is evident from evaluations that she
received at that time from the partner-in-charge of her office and from
another partner in her office: "terribly hard worker . . . always a
perfect product . . . she's unbelievable . . . [the State Department]

could not be happier with her, and this is a tough, very demanding
client ... Ann has to be one of the very best .. . has to be better than
many partners . . . there can't be many of equal capability . . .
intelligent . . . creative . . . hard working . . . decisive . . . self

confident . . . a leader . .. Ann's performance has been outstanding;

she is bright, imaginative and assertive and is an asset to the firm."
These evaluations state without reservation that plaintiff should be
promoted to partner as of July 1, 1983. For example, the partner-incharge declared simply that "she's ready!"
10. Candidates for partnership with defendant are nominated by their
local offices and are then selected following consultation within the
firm. In the autumn of 1982, plaintiffs office nominated her for
partnership. In late March 1983, however, she was notified that she
had not been selected. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was told that she
would have the opportunity to be considered for partnership again in
the selection cycle beginning in the autumn of 1983.
11. From March 1983 onward, plaintiff continued to perform in a
fully satisfactory manner and continued to be fully qualified for
partnership. For example, in September 1983 a State Department
official wrote defendant a laudatory letter concerning the real property
management project, for which plaintiff was responsible. The letter
concluded that the "project is producing a high quality management
tool which will meet the Department's needs. I am very pleased with
the performance of all members of the project team."
12. Despite the continuing high quality of her performance, plaintiff
was notified in August 1983 that her office would not be nominating
her for partnership during the selection cycle beginning in the autumn
of 1983. At that time, she was told that it was unlikely that she would
ever become a partner and that she should seriously consider leaving
the firm.
13. There is no legitimate basis for defendant's refusal to admit
plaintiff into membership with the firm by promoting her to partner,
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and defendant has excluded plaintiff from membership because of her
sex. Plaintiff is as qualified, or more qualified, for promotion to
partner than men who have been promoted to partner in the recent
past, both in Washington, D.C. and nationwide. For example, of the
three men (and no women) who became partners in plaintiffs office
in 1983, one had worked for defendant for less time than she had,
while another had served as her subordinate. Defendant has never
criticized plaintiffs performance; on the contrary, her evaluations
have consistently been enthusiastic. The only suggestion made by
defendant to plaintiff was that she "soften" her image. In this regard,
it was suggested that she wear make-up.and style her hair.
14. On August 30, 1983, plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that defendant had
excluded her from membership in the firm because of her sex. As a
result of filing her charge, plaintiff was subjected to retaliation and
harassment, including intensive and unwarranted project reviews;
efforts to elicit information from plaintiffs subordinates that would
discredit her; and the assignment of her office to another employee.
15. As a result of defendant's actions described herein, plaintiff was
subjected to constructive discharge by defendant effective January 17,
1984. On February 8, 1984, plaintiff filed a second charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that she had
been subjected to retaliation and constructive discharge for filing the
first charge. Defendant has continued to retaliate against plaintiff
following her constructive discharge.
16. At the time plaintiff was hired by defendant, defendant
contracted to consider her for partnership on the basis of her
performance, and this contractual assurance induced plaintiff to
accept employment with defendant. In addition, defendant routinely
considers employees in plaintiffs position for partnership after they
have served a period of "aprenticeship," and defendant explicitly uses
the prospect of future partnership to induce new employees to join the
firm. Consideration for partnership was a term, condition or privilege
of plaintiff s employment with defendant.
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COUNT ONE
TITLE VII
17. Paragraphs 1-16 herein are realleged.
18. All prerequisites to suit under Title VII have been satisfied.
19. The acts of defendant in excluding plaintiff from partnership
because of her sex, and in harassing her and subjecting her to
constructive discharge, constitute violations of Title VII. Unless
restrained by order of this Court, defendant will continue to pursue
such unlawful practices.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff asks that this Court:
1) enjoin defendant from discriminating in partnership decisions on
the basis of sex;
2) enjoin defendant from retaliation against individuals who have
engaged in activities protected by Title VII;
3) require defendant to accord plaintiff partnership compensation and
all accrued benefits;
4) award such other relief as the interests of justice may require,
including payment of plaintiffs costs and disbursements herein
and her reasonable attorneys' fees.
COUNT TWO
D.C. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
20. Paragraphs 1-16 herein are realleged.
21. All prerequisites to suit under the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act have been satisfied.
22. The acts of defendant in excluding plaintiff from partnership
because of her sex, and in harassing her and subjecting her to
constructive discharge, constitute intentional, willful, wanton,
reckless and malicious violations of the District of Columbia Human
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Rights Act. Unless restrained by order of this Court, defendant will
continue to pursue such unlawful practices.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff asks that the Court:
1) enjoin defendant from discriminating in partnership decisions
on the basis of sex;
2)

enjoin defendant from retaliating against individuals who have
engaged in activities protected by the Human Rights Act;

3) require defendant to accord plaintiff partnership status
effective July 1, 1983, with full retroactive compensation and
all accrued benefits;
4)

award plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages for inter
alia pain, suffering, humiliation and emotional distress caused
by defendant's unlawful actions;

5) award plaintiff $1,000,000 in punitive damages;
6)

award such other relief as the interests of justice may require,
including payment of plaintiffs costs and disbursements
herein and her reasonable attorneys' fees.
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JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff requests trial by jury as to all issues in Count Two of this
Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

Douglas B. Huron

KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER
1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-393-3800
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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